In this paper I discuss how to account for the performative effects of imperatives, and concentrate mainly on permission sentences. In the first part of the paper I argue that the performative effects of permission sentences should be accounted for in terms of a context change theory by making use of contraction defined in terms of an ordering relation, and show also how this ordering relation evolves from permission to permission. In the second part a problem for this analysis is discussed, i.e. the problem of conjunctive permission sentences. I develop two ways to solve this problem. First, I suggest that this problem is due to the wrong way of accounting for contraction, and propose an alternative way in which contraction can be defined that accounts for the performative effects of conjunctive permissions in a more satisfactory way. Although the analysis is appealing, I will argue that we should account for the problem by means of a type-shift analysis.
INTRODUCTION
According to Austin's (1962) speech act analysis, by using sentences we perform certain linguistic acts. The traditional problem for speech act analyses was to find interesting types of speech acts, and to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful performance of the act. In later theories of context change the emphasis was on the essential effects of speech acts. In Stalnaker's (1978) classical analysis of assertions, for instance, the essential effect of an assertion is said to be the change it brings about in what is commonly assumed; the context that represents what is commonly assumed is incremented with the content of the assertion. More recently, the essential effects of other speech acts, like questions and denials, have been analyzed in terms of context change, too. The goal of this paper is to follow up some classical papers of Kamp and Lewis to characterize in a context change theory the essential effects of imperatives, normally stated in terms of command and permission sentences of the form You must/may do A.
In sections 2 and 3, I will discuss whether we can account for the performative effects of command/obligation and permission sentences by treating them assertorically, or whether we should treat them as explicit performatives. I will argue for the latter option. This gives rise to the question in what way command and permission sentences change the context. In the third section I will show how we can account for the change when we represent the prior information state by a preference order, and how in terms of this change we can predict most intuitions about coordination connectives and quantificational determiners. In section 4, I discuss the problem how imperatives determine the preference order of the posterior information state, relate the account of the third section with Veltman's analysis of defaults in update semantics, and with analyses of iterated revision. In the sections that follow it, I will concentrate on a particular problem for our analysis that was noted first by Merin (1992) : the problem of conjunctive permissions. First, I will show how the standard analysis of contraction used for the analysis of permission sentences gives rise to this problem, and in the last two sections I will discuss some ways in which the problem can be solved when we give up the assumption that all that counts are the propositions that are expressed by the embedded clauses of permission sentences.
PERFORMATIVE EFFECT IN TERMS OF ASSERTION
According to Austin's classical analysis of speech acts, sentences of the form You must/may do A are not used to describe a states of affairs. In terms of the language game between master and slave as described by Lewis (1970/79) , they are typically used by one person, the master, to command or permit another person, the slave, to do certain things. How should we account for these so-called performative effects of the sentences used by the master? One proposal might be to say that command and permission sentences are assertorically used, but that the performative effect is accounted for in an indirect way, due to the fact that we learn, or realize, more about the world (Kamp 1979) . One of the things one might learn about the world is what is demanded and permitted. A truth conditional analysis of what is demanded and permitted is given in deontic logic. Standard deontic logic (SDL) was based on the same principles as classical modal logic.
1 Where normal modal logic has the operators • and O standing for necessity and possibility, SDL has the two operators O and P, standing for ought or obliged and for permission, respectively. Just like • and O are duals of each other, also P is defined in terms of O as follows: P(A) = -IO (-<A) for any proposition A. In model theory, we define O(A) to be true in w iff in all ideal worlds accessible from w, A is true, and P(A) to be true iff A is consistent with this set of all ideal worlds, i.e. if there is at least one ideal world accessible from w in which A is true. 2 The set of ideal worlds in w will be denoted by P(tv), and is known as the permissibility set. According to the standard theories of context change for assertions (Stalnaker 1978) , the effect of the successful assertion that A is the case is that the context, K, which represents what is commonly assumed by the participants of the conversation, changes from K to {w G K \ w makes A true}.
3 Note that according to the truth conditional analysis used in SDL, what the agent is obliged and permitted to do is a fact about the world, represented by the world-dependence of the permissibility set. What is permitted in different worlds might be different; i.e. P(w) need not be the same as P{w') for any two worlds w and w' inK. If we now learn that John is permitted to make A true, we learn something about the world. As in standard context change theory this can be accounted for by eliminating those worlds from K whose permissibility set contains no A -worlds. Thus, if Upd(A, K) denotes the update of information state K with A, we define Upd(P(A),K) as {w G K: P{w) DA ^ 0}. We might now propose that the performative effect of command and permission sentences is due to the fact that only after a command or permission sentence is used by the master, the slave knows that he is obliged/permitted to do something, and acts accordingly.
This assertoric analysis seems appropriate for some uses of command and permission sentences, but there are serious problems for the analysis too. First, a truth conditional analysis of imperatives gives rise to the expectation that command and permission sentences can be iterated, or embedded into one another, which in fact seems impossible. 4 Second, it is rather questionable whether the performative effect of all permission sentences should be accounted for in the epistemic way sketched above. Consider the following sentences:
(1) a. You may take an apple, b. You may take a pear, c. You may take an apple or take a pear.
2 In this paper I will use capitals for both sentential clauses and the propositions expressed by them. I hope this will never lead to confusion.
3 If we forget about introspection, and consider only monotone updates. 4 I should note, though, that also the standard truth conditional analysis can account for the intuition that the formula O(O(A)) should mean the same as O(^4);just assume that the accessibility relation is both transitive and dense. A deontic accessibility relation is dense if every deontic alternative is a deontic alternative to a deontic alternative.
According to SDL, (ic) follows from both (ia) and (ib), and neither (ia) nor (ib) follows from (ic). Normally, however, if we make a disjunctive permission, both disjuncts are also permitted. The most straightforward way to account for this strong reading of disjunctive permissions would be to add the Free Choice Permission, FCP = P(A V B) => P(A) A P(B) as an axiom to the formal theory. Unfortunately, if we assume that FCP is a theorem of the logic, we can derive in our deontic logic that everything was allowed. Because in normal deontic logic we can derive O(A V B) from O(A), and because P(A V B) follows by our above definition of P from O(A V B), the assumption that FCP would be a theorem of deontic logic has the consequence that from O(A) we could derive P(B) for any A and B. But this has the unwanted result that by demanding or allowing something, you permit everything else. Suppose, for instance, that you are allowed to walk in the park, P(A). By logic, this means that you are also allowed to walk in the park or kill the king, P(A VB). If FCP were valid, this would mean that allowing you to walk in the park, also allows you to kill the king.
Thus, already for logical reasons alone, our analysis should not obey disjunction elimination, i.e. FCP. But the assumption of disjunction elimination is empirically wrong, too. As Kamp (1979) observed, there is nothing problematic with the assertion of the following permission sentence:
(2) You may take an apple or a pear, but I don't know which.
We can conclude that we should not make FCP valid by stipulation. An assertoric analysis of permission sentences based on standard deontic logic indeed does not allow for disjunction elimination. It remains mysterious, however, how such an analysis can account for the fact that normally we conclude from a permission of a disjunction to the permission of its disjuncts.
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There is another phenomenon that the SDL-truth conditional analysis cannot explain. This is the fact that quantificational determiners are not interpreted in the same way in permission sentences on the one hand and in obligation/command sentences on the other. Note that permission sentences obey existential weakening, i.e. we are allowed to infer (3b) from (3a):
3 But see Kamp (1979) for some proposals by using Gricean conversational implicatures, and Merin (1992) for a critical discussion. For a very interesting proposal that I came across only recently, see Higginbotham (1991) . He claims that by assuming that (i) or is short for either/or, (ii) is scopally ambiguous, and (iii) that either is systematically ambiguous between a negative polarity item (an existential) and a 'free-choice' item (a universal), we can explain why disjunctive permissions can be interpreted conjunctively within a truth conditional analysis. As he admits himself, however, such a truth conditional analysis leaves unresolved the problem why a disjunction under a deontic adjective of permission gives rise to a conjunctive interpretation, while this need not be the case for a disjunction under the metaphysical adjective possible. Indeed, this is predicted by the standard truth conditional account, because permissions are predicted to be closed under logical implication. But what this account cannot predict is why quantifiers under the scope of may get the 'at most' reading, while in the scope of must they get the 'at least' reading. Intuitively, after (3 a) is said by the master, the slave is allowed to eat none, one, two, or three apples, but not more. But if the master says that you must eat three apples, it is still possible that you may eat more than three apples. On the standard truth conditional account, however, this cannot be explained, because quantifiers always get the same 'at least' interpretation.
THE PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF IMPERATIVES
The natural alternative to the assertoric analysis of obligation and permission sentences is the performative one. According to the performative analyses of Lewis (1970/79), Stalnaker (MS) , and Kamp (1973) , command and permission sentences are not primarily used to make true assertions about the world, but rather to change that what the slave is obliged/ permitted to do. 6 With some feeling for Amsterdam rhetorics, we might say that according to the performative analysis, we know the meaning of an imperative sentence when we know how imperatives change permissibility sets.
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According to this Lewis/Kamp/Stalnaker account, if the master commands John to do A by saying You must do A, or allows John to do A by saying You may do A, it is typically not yet the case that the proposition expressed by A is respectively a superset of, or consistent with, John's permissibility set, P. 8 However, the performative effect of the command/ permission will be such that in the new context what is commanded is a superset of, and what is permitted is consistent with, the new permissibility set. Thus, in case the command or permission is not used vacuously, the permissibility set, P', of the new context will be different from P, so that the obligation/permission sentence will be satisfied.
But if knowing the meaning of an imperative means that you have to know how the imperative changes the permissibility set, our problem is to say how command and permission sentences govern the change from the prior permissibility set, P, to the posterior one, P'.
For commands this problem seems to have an easy solution. If the command You must do A is given by the master, the new, or posterior, set of permissible futures for John, P 1 , is simply P n A. 9 However, things are more complicated for permission sentences. It is clear that if A is allowed, P' should be a superset of P such that P' D A ^ 0. It is not clear, however, which A -worlds should be added to P. Obviously, we cannot simply say that P' = PU A. By that suggestion, an allowance for A would allow everything compatible with A, which is certainly not what we want. But how then should the change from P to P' be determined if a permission is made? This is Lewis's problem about permissions.
Stalnaker (MS) suggested that Lewis's problem about permissions can be solved when we know not only what the best, or ideal, worlds are, but also assume that some of the non-ideal worlds are better than others. Thus, to account for the performative effects of commands and permissions, we need not only a set of ideal worlds, but rather a whole preference, or reprehensibility, ordering, <, on the set of all possible worlds. On the interpretation that u < v iff v is at least as reprehensible as u, it is natural to assume that this relation should be reflexive, transitive, and connected. 10 We might assume a primitive preference relation among worlds, but we can also follow Harper (1976) and determine an ordering relation on worlds by looking at the number of obligatory propositions that worlds make true. Van Fraassen (1973) and Kratzer (1981) have argued that to account for moral deliberation we should not rule out the possibility that the command-sentences that determine what should be done might be mutually inconsistent. Let O be the set of propositions that John is obliged to make true. Then we say that u is at least as desirable as v with respect to O, M <o v, iff the set of commands in O that v makes true, \{A G O\ v G ^4}|, is smaller than or equal to the set of commands in O that u makes true, \{A G O\ u G A}\, where \S\ is the cardinality of S.
u In terms of this preference order on possible worlds, we can determine the set of worlds that make as much as possible commands true; the minimal 9 What if the new command is incompatible with one or more of the earlier ones? In that case we might make use of change by revision to be discussed below.
10 A relation R is reflexive if for all w: R(w, u>), it is transitive if for all w, v and u: if R(w, v) and R(v, u), then R(w, u) , and it is connected if for all w and v, R(u>, v) or R(v, in) or ic = v. " Van Fraassen (1973) and Kratzer (1981) use a different way to determine the preference relation. They say that « <o v iff {A € O\ v e A} C {A 6 O\ u 6 A}. In this way, < 0 determines a partial ordering, but not a total one. Not all worlds have to be connected with each other. elements of the relation < o . Thus, if we call this set of minimal elements P, P can be defined as follows:
In terms of this set of ideal worlds we can, as before, determine of course whether according to the present state A is obliged or permitted.
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But this ordering relation contains more information than just what the set P of ideal worlds is, and in terms of this extra information we can determine the new permissibility set P'. If the master permits the slave to make A true, we can assume that P contains no A -worlds, i.e. none of the A -worlds is ideal. But some A -worlds are still better than other A -worlds. Stalnaker proposes that the effect of allowing A is that the best A -worlds are added to the old permissibility set to figure as the new permissibility set. In modern terminology (cf. Gardenfors 1988), we might say that the change from P to P' due to a permission sentence is accounted for in terms of contraction, the rational retracting of information from an earlier information state, where contraction is governed by a reprehensibility ordering <o> which I will denote by < from now on. I will define contraction in terms of revision, and the revision of P by any proposition A can be defined in terms of the relation < as follows: P* A ={u€A\VveA: u<v} It turns out that our revision function V will satisfy the following constraints on minimal change for any set of worlds K (cf. Harper 1975) , so in particular for P:
The first condition demands that the new state should contain the new information. The second requires that changing with new consistent information results in a new consistent information state. The third and fourth condition demand that the change is conservative; if A is consistent with K, K A is simply K to which A is added, and if B is consistent with K A , then receiving the information B after the information that A has the same ' 2 Note that if the propositions in O are mutually consistent, P is just (~| O. 13 For instance, A is obligatory iff P C A. Notice that in terms of our preference order we also might go for various other analyses of obligation. Just to mention one, we could say that the slave is obliged to make A true iff V(v, w) € < : if w€A, then v€A. Notice that this analysis of obligation, unlike the standard one, does not predict that obligations are closed under logical implication. effect as receiving the information A and B together. These rules are the analogues of the familiar AGM-postulates for revision, 14 when it is assumed that information states and propositions are modeled by sets of possible worlds. If we now define the contraction of K by A, K A , via the Harper identity as K U K^A, it follows that also the usual AGM-postulates for contraction will be satisfied.
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To implement Stalnaker's suggestion, we can say that the change induced by the permission You may do A is that the new permission set, P r , results from P by contracting ->A: P' = P~A, which is P U P A . 16 Thus, according to this proposal, command and permission sentences change a context of interpretation as follows (where I assume that John is the relevant agent, and P his permission state):
Note first that if change by permission is governed by the reprehensibility ordering, the absence of the 'at least' interpretation of the quantificational determiners used in the embedded sentences is immediately explained. If according to the prior state John was not even allowed to take one single apple, one might assume that worlds where he takes only one apple are 'closer' to the worlds in P, than worlds where he takes more. So, after the permission that he may take an apple, the new permission set, P', can be expected to contain only worlds where he takes at most one apple. 17 Note that by our analysis it is also predicted that the quantificational determiners in command sentences get the usual 'at least' reading, just as desired. Thus, our performative analysis of command and permission sentences can predict and explain certain intuitions about the behavior of quantificational determiners which the standard truth conditional, or assertoric, analysis cannot.
Note that according to our performative account it does not follow that for a permission sentence of the form You may do A or B the slave can infer 14 Alchouron, Gardenfors, & Makinson (1985) . See Giardenfors (1988) for a general overview of theories of belief revision.
15 By representing information states as sets of possible worlds, the 8 AGM-postulates for contraction come down to the following (K~i) -(rC~u):
16 This analysis of permission sentences, and thus of contraction, was assumed by Kamp (1979) and Merin (1992) in their discussions of the performative analysis of permissions.
17 Rohrbaugh (1996) wrongly claimed that the possible world framework as such always predicts the at least readings for quantified permission sentences like (3a) and (3b). that according to the new permissibility set he is allowed to do any of the disjuncts, nor is the arbitrary interpretation of indefinites guaranteed. Still, the performative analysis can give an explanation why indefinites and disjuncts are normally interpreted in this 'free-choice' way. To do this, let me first define a deontic preference relation between propositions in terms of our reprehensibility relation between worlds, <. We can say that although both A and B are incompatible with the set of ideal worlds, A is still deontically preferred to B, A ^B, iff the best A -worlds are closer to the ideal worlds than the best B-worlds, 3v G A and VM € B : v < «.
18 Then we can say that with respect to <, A and B are equally strongly reprehensible, A £2 B, iff A ;< B and B < A. Because we defined contraction via the Harper identity in terms of revision, and because any revision function that obeys (K*i) -{K*4) satisfies the following factoring condition:
if B<A, and
we can now explain why normally disjunction elimination is allowed for permission sentences. For simple disjunctive permission sentences like You may do A or B, it is not unreasonable to assume that by Gricean, or strategic, reasoning we can conclude (perhaps after accommodation) that when performatively used the master has no strict preference for the one above the other.
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This does not mean that this reasoning can be accounted for in a straightforward way. It would be nice to explain the strong reading completely in terms of conversational implicatures. Kamp (1979) shows, however, that by the way conversational implicatures are normally 18 The epistemic variant of this ordering relation between propositions is called the epistemic entrenchment relation.
19 Where A -< B iff A x B, but not B<A. 20 But this doesn't always seem to be the case; as noted by Kamp (1973) , even for the performative analysis of permission sentences the arbitrarily interpretation can be cancelled: You may pick a flower, but don't pick a rose, or You may do A or B, but don't do the dangerous one. However, as mentioned by Kamp (1979) , and stressed by Zimmermann (1999) , for epistemic uses of may, it seems that the choice effect cannot be cancelled. That is, it seems that from (i)John might be in Amsterdam or in Utrecht we can derive both (ii) John might be in Amsterdam, and (iii)John might be in Utrecht, and we cannot follow (i) by saying but I forget which. These facts are difficult to explain when a truth-conditional analysis of disjunction is assumed together with any treatment where epistemic might is analyzed as a consistency check such as in Veltman (1997) . But now suppose that epistemic might is typically used to bring certain possibilities to the attention of the audience, as was considered by Kamp (1979: 281) . In that case, it seems not unreasonable to analyze epistemic might in similar ways as we analyze permission sentences in this paper, i.e. by means of contraction of an information state. Thus, might(A) analyzed with respect to epistemic state K does not check whether A is consistent with K, but rather adds to K worlds that make A true. This does not yet guarantee a choice reading of a sentence like Might(A V B), but it does when we assume that K is not yet consistent with A V B, and that our disjunctive epistemic sentence can only be appropriately uttered when ->A and ->B are equally strong entrenched in K. It is perhaps asking a lot to assume that A V B is inconsistent with what is implicitly presupposed, but we can also imagine a model where K represents what is explicitly presupposed, i.e. where it represents that part of the common ground of which all participants are fully aware.
understood, as inferences that take as one of their arguments the proposition expressed by sentences, these implicatures can be of no help to explain the strong reading of disjunctive permissions. The problem is that these strong readings should also be predicted in case disjunctive permissions are embedded in larger sentences such that the proposition expressed by this larger sentence does not entail the proposition expressed by the embedded disjunctive permission sentence. The following example is given:
(4) Usually you may only take an apple. So if you may take an apple or take a pear, you should bloody well be pleased.
To account for the strong reading of performatively used disjunctive permissions it seems that we have to build the implicature into the meaning of or, that is, we have to assume that the relevant implicature is not a conversational one, but a conventional one instead. But then, how should we account for this conventional implicature? We might propose that disjunctions of the form P V Q can only be appropriately interpreted in contexts K such that P D ->Q ll K* VQ ^ 0 and ->P n Q n K*^Q ^ 0.
21 As a result, it is predicted that a normal sentence of the form A or B can only be appropriately asserted in a context K that is compatible with both A A ->B and ->A A B, 22 and that a permission sentence like You may do A or B can only be said appropriately by the master to John iff he is indifferent between A and B, A ~ B. Kamp (1973) argued that just as we can define an inference relation between propositions, we might also define an inference relation between performatively used permission sentences, which he called *p-entailment'. In terms of our framework, he proposes that permission sentence May{B) is p-entailed by permission sentence May(A), iff for every appropriate initial permissibility ordering <, no new worlds would be added to the set of ideal worlds through the use of May{B) after the initial permissibility set was 'updated' through the use of May (A). On the assumption that < can only be an appropriate initial permissibility ordering for the performatively used May(A VB) iff A « B, we can conclude that both (ia) and (ib) are jj-entailed by (ic).
23 Some readers will see that Kamp's notion of j?-entailment is rather close to Veltman's (1996) fixed-point notion of entailrnent between speech acts. 24 21 Zimmermann (1999) has recently argued that this condition does not count as an appropriateness condition for disjunction, but is part of the semantic meaning. 22 This is exactly what Stalnaker (1975) proposes to be the acceptability conditions for disjunctive sentences. 23 Notice that according to this entailment relation we do not predict that we can infer May(A V B) from May(A), and thus that Ross's paradox does not arise. 24 See also Stalnaker (1975) for his notion of reasonable inference. Lewis (1979) complained that an account in terms of reprehensibilitygradings of worlds might handle single cases of permissions, but leaves undetermined how the comparative permissibility relation evolves from permission to permission. Actually, the problem exists already for the case of commands. But here the problem can be solved almost straightforwardly in a way made familiar to us by the analysis of defaults in update semantics by Veltman (1996) . According to one version of Veltman's system, an information state, {K, <), consists of two parts: (i) a set of possible worlds, K, which represents the factual knowledge we assume, and (ii) our reflexive and transitive ordering relation, <, on worlds. Until now we have assumed that for the analysis of the command You must do A we only need to look at the best worlds according to <, and we only gave a partial description of the resulting state; we only defined what the best worlds are in the new information state, not what the whole new ordering relation will be. But given Veltman's analysis of 'normally', it is quite straightforward to say how the new ordering relation after the update with the command should look like:
CHANGING PREFERENCES
Veltman's update semantics can be used to account for the performative effect of normal commands or obligations, but it also seems to be the natural framework to account for conditional obligations like If Jesse robbed the bank, he ought to confess. In the standard analyses of Hansson (1969) , Lewis (1973) , Spohn (1975) , and Kratzer (1978) , conditional obligations are treated solely in terms of our ordering relation <. Just like a standard obligation to do A is satisfied in the traditional truth-conditional analysis when the best worlds according to < are all A -worlds, they say that an obligation to do A on the condition that C is satisfied when the best C-worlds according to the ordering relation are all A -worlds. Notice that the analyses of conditional obligations by the above authors are all static; they only say when a conditional obligation is true, not what the performative effect is of the use of a conditional obligation sentence.
Fortunately, this performative effect can be easily accounted for in terms of the framework Veltman (1996) uses for the analysis of rules of exception. To account for rules of exception in update semantics, Veltman no longer represents an information state by a pair like (K, <), where < orders the worlds in W (and thus in K), but rather by a pair like (K, n), where n is a function taking as argument a proposition, A, and has as value an ordering relation < A restricted to the A -worlds. On the assumption that conditional obligations state rules of exception, the natural thing to say is that the information state (K, TT) accepts the conditional obligation 'Must(B), if A' iff the best worlds according to the ordering relation n(A) are all B-worlds. Now we can also account for the performative effect of conditional obligations as follows:
Upd ((ifA,Must(B) ), (K,TT) 
Although this analysis of conditional obligations is somewhat different from the traditional Hansson/Lewis/Spohn/Kratzer one, it shares with it an unwanted consequence. Note that both according to the traditional approach, and according to the analysis above, it is predicted that conditional obligations of the form If A, then Must (A) should be tautologically true. But that does not seem to be the case; the conditional obligation If you rob banks, you should rob banks is not trivially acceptable. Hansson (1969) already noted this prediction, but argued (somewhat mysteriously) that it is not really problematic. Spohn (1975) was not so confident about this anymore, and, in a more recent discussion, Frank (1997) argued that this prediction shows that the traditional analysis of conditional obligations must be on the wrong track.
If the traditional analysis of conditional obligations must be rejected because of the predicted validity of sentences of the form If A, then Must{A), our analysis of conditional obligations must be rejected, too. But in distinction with the traditional approach towards conditional obligations, we can easily change the formal analysis such that the problematic prediction disappears. Note that in the above analysis we have assumed, just like Veltman (1996) did for the analysis of default rules, that the ordering relation TT(A) only orders the A -worlds. This has the result that the best worlds in TT(A) are by necessity all A -worlds. But, as we just saw, this is exactly what gives rise to the unwanted prediction that If A, then Must (A) must always be accepted. This suggests that our problem can simply be solved if we give up the assumption that for any A, ~(A) only orders the worlds in A; we simply assume that for all A, TT{A) orders the set of all worlds, W. 26 This doesn't mean that thus the condition has no effect anymore; it still might be the case that for different propositions A and B, the best worlds according to rr(A) are different from the best worlds according to TT(B) . Then we might say that for the analysis of some conditional obligations we should only consider worlds that satisfy the antecedent, while for others we should not restrict the ordering relation in such a way.
We have seen that in terms of Veltman's update semantics we can determine not only how the set of best worlds evolves through the making of a (conditional) command, but even how the (set of) ordering relation(s) change(s). Although this is a stimulating result, it is still not clear how the ordering relation should evolve through the use of a permission sentence. The reason behind it is that the above analysis of the performative effects of (conditional) obligation sentences is essentially eliminative; through these sentences certain elements of the ordering relation that help to represent the information state are thrown away. The problem with permission sentences is that it does not seem to be possible to account for their performative effect in an eliminative way. It follows that we need an account that determines what the ordering relation looks like in the posterior information state, even if the change cannot be accounted for by eliminating possibilities.
Notice that the problem we face is similar to the problem how to account for iterated belief revision. According to the standard analyses of belief revision, a prior information state is represented by an ordering relation like our <. If we revise this state withal, it is said that the posterior information state will be the set of best A -worlds according to <. But notice the difference in kind between prior and posterior information states; prior information states are ordering relations, while posterior information states are just sets of worlds. Because of this difference, the traditional approaches of revision can only account for so-called 'one-shot' revisions, but leave undetermined how iterated revisions should be accounted for. But this means that Lewis's problem as stated in the beginning of this section can still not be solved. Meanwhile, however, there are several accounts of iterated revision around that can represent a posterior information state as an ordering relation, too. Using any of those approaches towards iterated revision, we could analyze permission sentences as functions from one comparative permissibility relation to another. In the remainder of this section we will show how Lewis's problem can be solved when we make use of the first analysis of iterated revision due to Harper (I976).
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Suppose that P is a set of possible worlds denoting a permission set. Then it seems reasonable to assume with Harper that only propositions decided by P determine the ordering relation in terms of which revisions of P should be defined. If we assume that S is an arbitrary set of propositions, and x and u are worlds, we can define the set of P-decided propositions in S on which x and M differ, S*P, as follows: S*P = {A e S: (P C A or P C -iA) and
Now we define a relational measure of reprehensibility based on the assumption that only the propositions that are decided by P determine this measure. How is that done? We can say that v is at least as reprehensible as u, iff for any world w in P, the cardinality of the P-decided designated propositions on which u differs from w is less than or equal to the cardinality of the P-decided designated propositions on which v differs from w. More formally, we can define relative reprehensibility in the following way: u < P v iff \S"P\ is smaller than or equal to IS^Pl, for any w£P, where S is the set of designated propositions that potentially determine reprehensibility.
28 From this definition it follows that the ordering relation < P is reflexive, transitive, and connected. In terms of this ordering relation we can define the revision of P by A, P%, as usual: P^ ={« £A\ vV eA: u< P v). Because the ordering relation is reflexive, transitive and connected, it should be clear that the revision function satisfies (K*i) -(iC*4.), just like the revision function we defined in the previous section.
Thus, given a set, S, of propositions that potentially determine reprehensibility, 29 we can determine for each permissibility set P a corresponding ordering relation < P that determines the result of the revision of P by A. In the previous section we have determined the change of the permissibility set due to a given permission in terms of contraction. This contraction, in turn, was defined in terms of revision, and thus indirectly in terms of the ordering relation. But this means that we can determine, via Harper's method, not only how the permissibility set changes due to a permission, but also how the reprehensibility relation evolves from permission to permission, and thus solving Lewis's problem as stated in the beginning of this section.
CONJUNCTIVE PERMISSION SENTENCES
In the discussion of Kamp (1979) the main concern was to account for the problematic disjunctive permission sentences. The above discussed analysis in terms of contraction goes a long way in solving this problem. But as noticed by Merin (1992) , this analysis also gives rise to a new problem: the problem of how to account for the performative effect of the use of conjunctive permission sentences. 30 In the original Stalnaker account it is predicted that a conjunctive permission sentence You may take an apple and a pear has semantically the package deal effect: take either none or botL The reason is that P* A AB is a subset of the proposition expressed by A A B, and thus that the only worlds in P~i AAB \ (which is P U P* A AB ) where either A or B are true, are worlds where both are true, if P D (A V B) Merin (1992) , the 'package deal' interpretation is empirically a rare special case, and usually requires that one of the conjuncts be interpreted as a countervailing demand.
Indeed, for the majority of the conjunctive permission sentences this package-deal prediction is empirically wrong, since these other conjunctive permissions allow also for the conjuncts to be done separately. That is, the prediction conflicts with the intuition that conjunctive permissions normally permit free choice among four options: both conjuncts, the first, the second, or either conjunct. If I say, for example, You may take an apple and take a pear, or You may walk and talk, you normally do not have to 30 This problem was not discussed by Kamp, although in Kamp (1973) he did discuss the closely related problem of accounting for permissions like You may take [any flower/every flower/all flowers] growing in the garden. Because I take this latter problem to be similar to the one to be discussed in this paper, I will not deal with such permissions separately. 31 To a great extend, the problem is due to the validity of the recovery-postulate for standard contraction. Let me explain: By defining contraction in terms of revision by means of the Harper identity, it follows that if K C A, K^ nA = K, Le. after contracting K with A, you can recover the original state K by learning A. In particular, this means that P"^ AB \ f~) ->(A A B) = P. For the analysis of conjunctive permission sentences, standard contraction does normally not add enough worlds to the prior information state, because it seems that we want it to be the case that normally after contracting P with -> (A A B) we need not come back to our original state P when it is commanded that ->{A A B). fear my punishment if you only take an apple, or only walk, respectively. Merin (1992) concludes that we should thus give up the analysis of permission sentences in terms of reprehensibility orderings, and that permission sentences stand in the way of Boolean and other latticetheoretic semantics. In the rest of this paper I will take up the challenge to improve on the Stalnaker analysis, without giving up the assumption that the performative effect of permissions should be accounted for in terms of contraction.
32 Can we get rid of the package-deal effect, and still analyze the effects of permissions in terms of contraction? And can we do this without even giving up a Boolean, or latice-theoretic, analysis of what is denoted by the embedded clause?
At first appearance there seems to be an easy solution, based on a very simple intuition. Normally if the master allows you to do something, you can count on it that it is the 'worst' thing for him that he allows you to do. This seems to mean that when he allows you to do A, he also allows you anything that is less bad for him; i.e. he implicitly also allows you to make true any proposition B such that B ;< A. This suggests that we should analyze permission sentences in the following way:
Upd(May(john,A),P) = [j {P* B \B <A} n
Notice that for any propositions A and B such that A C B it will be the case that B < A. Because both A and B follow from A A B, it is predicted that if it is allowed that A A B, also A and B alone are allowed, which seems just what we wanted. Now it appears as if our new analysis goes wrong exactly where the original Stalnakerian analysis makes the correct predictions. Suppose that his mother allows John to give a party and clean the house afterwards. Allowing John to give a party and clean, A AB, entails according to our analysis allowing John to give a party, A. But, then, his mother does not allow John simply to give a party, but only if he cleans afterwards. Fortunately, our analysis immediately accounts for this apparent problem. If his mother allows John to give a party, only the 'best' party-worlds are added to the set according to the reprehensibility ordering. It is natural to assume that in the given circumstances the best party-worlds (according to his mother) are only worlds where John gives a party and cleans the house 32 What I will give up, however, is that the only thing that counts is the prepositional content determined by the embedded clause of the permission sentence. In this sense I agree with Gazdar (1981) and others that for different speech act types, different types of denotations might be involved. Remember that according to almost any modern analysis of questions, for instance, the denotations involved are not simply propositions. 33 Because for any A, it will always be the case that T ^ A, and that for any P,Pj=P we do not have to define the resulting state in terms of the revised state united with the original state anymore.
afterwards. Thus, no world is added where he gives a party and does not clean, which shows that the apparent problem is not a real one. However, the above suggested solution must be given up for another reason. It wrongly predicts that after the allowance of A A B, not only A and B are allowed, but also everything else that is less reprehensible than A A B, such as (A A B) V C. Thus, if a proposition C that is not allowed in the prior context and is totally unrelated to A, but less reprehensible than A, the above interpretation rule would have the unwanted effect that the allowance of A also allows the agent to do C.
We have seen that by analyzing permission sentences in terms of the standard contraction function, not enough worlds are added to the permissibility set after the permission to do A A B, while analyzing permission sentences in terms of our second contraction function would have the result that too much worlds are added. If we want to analyze permission sentences in terms of contraction, it seems that we need to define contraction such that the result of contracting P by ->A is somewhere in between PUP] and (J {P£| B ;< A}. 34 What seems to be missing is a notion of relevance, i.e. if we are allowed to do A, not all worlds are allowed that are at least as good as the best A -worlds, but only the B-worlds that are at least as good as the best A-worlds for any proposition B that is relevantly entailed by A? 5 Thus, it seems we should analyze permission sentences as follows:
Upd(May(john, A), P) = [j {PZ B \B < A & A i-» B}
where V->' is some kind of relevant entailment relation. Notice that by our reasoning above it holds that when our relevant entailment relation is stronger than the classical entailment relation, the analysis comes down to the following:
Upd{May{john,A),P) = [j {P^B\A~ B} 36
Our problem now seems to come down to finding a suitable entailment- 34 Notice that if we defined the contraction of P by ->A by (J {Pg\B ^A}, this contraction function would satisfy all AGM-posulates for contraction, except for (K~4), the one responsible for recovery. From this observation, and the fact that the contraction function that we will actually use for the analysis of permission sentences in this section will be 'stronger' than this contraction function, it follows that also our contraction function to be defined below will satisfy all these AGMpostulates for contraction. 35 For a nice discussion of the need for 'relevance contraction ', see Cantwell (1999) . His proposed analysis for relevant contraction is, however, different from mine, and will not help with our problem to account for conjunctive permission sentences. 36 Where P~B is P U Pg, as before. In the informal discussion in the main text, I did not call this function the actual contraction function anymore, but rather meant with the contraction from P with -i/4 the whole set (J {P~B\A >-* B}. It is perhaps good to note that if W is stronger than relation that does the job. We have seen already that the ordinary entailment-relation is too weak. Is there any stronger notion of entailment around that does our job? Given our informal talk about 'relevance', it seems that we should take a look at Anderson & Belnap's (1962) relevance logic. But that would be wrong, for their relevance logic, just like classical logic, predicts that for any propositions A and B it follows that A entails A V B. We have seen already that this has the unwanted result that allowing A might allow the slave also to do C, for a C that is totally unrelated with A. Still there exists a semantics for the logic of tautological entailment that suggests a way to define our sought after inference relation '*-*'.
6 EVENTS Until now we have assumed that propositions are the basic building blocks of meaning, and that 'and' and 'or' should always be treated as intersection and union, respectively. Others have been more radical, and proposed that we should look at different kinds of primitives. A motivation for us might be that it seems that permission sentences take mainly eventive clauses as complements that are denoted by to-infinitives (cf. Rohrbaugh (1996) and Portner (1997) ). Rohrbaugh argued, for instance, that for the analysis of permission sentences we need something like situation semantics, because we need a notion similar to, although not identical with, Kratzer's (1989) notion of lumping. He does not, however, give a formal definition of such a notion, but I will show how this can be done.
Proponents of this more radical solution typically take situations, facts, or events as primitives. Let us therefore look at one of the earliest analyses of such entities: van Fraassen's (1969) analysis of events or facts to give a semantics for the above-mentioned 'tautological entailment' relation.
Let us assume that an event-type is a set of events, and that an event itself is a set of urelements. We will say that each eventive clause will denote an event-type. The model determines, as always, which event-type is denoted by atomic eventive clauses, and we might, but need not, assume that atomic eventive clauses denote sets that contain only one set of urelements. Let us make the Russellian assumption that with, each atomic sentence p we can associate the 'urelements' p = I + (p) and p = I~(p), whose occurrence in a world would make p minimally true and false, respectively. Defining () to b e {{p}}> if P holds in w, and 0 otherwise, and something entailment, it still holds that (J {P^gl^ i -* B} !~\A = PJ. Thus, even if the contraction function does not satisfy the recovery postulate, the revision with A is still equal to adding A to the contraction of -i/4 (known as the Levi-identity in the belief revision literature). similar for i;(p), we can define tf(^l) =I~(A) and I~(^A) =l£(A) in the way familiar from partial logic. When the two eventive clauses A and B in w positively denote I* (A) and I*(B), respectively, the disjunctive eventive clause A VB will denote I* (A) \JI*(B), while the conjunctive eventive clause A AB will denote I* (A) X I+(B) . The set S X T is the product of 5 and T determined as follows: Sx T -{e U e'\ e € 5 and e' 6 T}.
37 '
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Our purpose of using eventives was to be able to define a consequence relation, '~>', that is stronger than ordinary entailment between propositions.
39 According to Rohrbaugh the consequence relation that we need for the analysis of permission sentences should also be closely related to Kratzer's notion of lumping. If we say that (A V B) }. This is interesting because it shows that if we want to give a uniform meaning to the conjunctive coordinator and in sentential and eventive clauses, we do not have to assume that and denotes Boolean intersection; we simply do not calculate primarily at the Boolean leveL Now we can use this consequence relation for the analysis of permission sentences. As expected, the new permission set after the allowance to do A will now be defined as (J {P~B \ A ~> B}. In this way the allowance to do A and B will always allow you to do both separately.
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As mentioned above, also Rohrbaugh (1996) used events to account for the effect of permission sentences. He argues that a permission to do A or B will always also give rise to the permission to do A and to do B. This is different from the way we have used eventives to analyze the effect of permission sentences ourselves, but we could, if we wanted, account for this intuition, too. Just say that the permissibility set changes after the allowance to do A from P to (J {P~B\3C (5) You may take an apple or a pear, but I don't know which.
A conjunctive permission, on the other hand, can sometimes really have the 'package deal' reading when it can naturally be interpreted as a conditional offer, like in (6) You may give a party and clean the house afterwards.
Our event-semantics allows us technically to account for the non freechoice readings of disjunctive permission sentences, but it is not clear whether it could account for the intuition why (5) has such a reading. Even more problematic is the fact that the 'package deal' interpretation of (6) cannot be accounted for.
At this point it seems that we should account for the different readings of coordinated permissions in terms of a notion of scope. Normally the disjunction in disjunctive permission sentences has narrow scope with respect to the speech act operator May, resulting in the free choice reading, but sometimes it takes wide scope, as for instance in a sentence like (5). For conjunctive permission sentences something similar happens, but then the other way around; normally the conjunction has wide scope, resulting in the reading where both conjuncts are allowed to be done separately, but sometimes the conjunction has narrow scope, as in (6), resulting in the package-deal reading. Notice that when we accounted for the non package-deal reading of conjunctive permission sentences in terms of scope, we would not have to give up the assumption that we could account for the performative effect of permissions in terms of ordinary contraction.
Although our problems seem to disappear when we allow the disjunction and conjunction to have scope over the speech act operator, there are a number of worries that such a proposal has to deal with. The first thing to note is that we have to allow connectives to take scope over speech act operators, which is very unusual. Second, and more seriously, an analysis that accounts for the non free-choice reading of disjunctive permission sentences, and for the non package-deal reading of conjunctive permissions, by assuming that the relevant connective has in the logical form syntactically wider scope than the speech act operator seems very unnatural (cf. Kamp 1979) , and contradicts the ceteris paribus preferred assumption of direct surface compositionality, the assumption that we do not need a mediating level of logical form for our semantics, i.e. that our compositional semantics directly assigns to each surface expression a model-theoretic interpretation.
It turns out, fortunately, that we can account for the intuition that the above-discussed 'scope-analysis' alludes to, without contradicting surface compositionality, if we make use of our best known type-shift: lifting. The type-shift operator of lifting is the operator from expressions of type r to expressions of type ((r, t),t), for any type r. This type-shift operator has been used by Partee & Rooth (1983) , for instance, to enable expressions of type r to conjoin with expressions of type ((r, (), t). 41 Following Montague (1973) , Keenan & Faltz (1985) propose that proper names, just like other NPs, should be analyzed as being of such a higher type from the very beginning. They notice that expressions of type ((r, t), t), are special in the sense that all denotations of this type can be thought of as Boolean combinations of the principle filters generated by the expressions of type r. The principle filter generated by the name John, for instance, can be denoted by {C C p(D)| {John € C}, where D is our set of urelements. Notice that on a Boolean analysis of conjunction, the sentence John and Mary danced is predicted to be true if and only if John danced and Mary danced. That is, the sentence can be true although John and Mary did not dance together, and {John} n {Mary} = 0, i.e. it matters when to apply Boolean intersection; application at the higher type results in a 'wide-scope' reading to 'and', but application at the lower type does not. 42 
((s,t),t),t),
i.e. sets of sets of propositions, which take as arguments that which is denoted by 'John hopes' (the set of propositions that John hopes), or 'Mary believes' (the set of propositions that Mary believes). 44 If we now assume that the word ' that' is a type-shifting operator that shifts a proposition, A, of type (5, t) into the principle filter generated by A, {CCp(W)\AeC}, of type (((s,t),t),t), it will make a difference whether we apply the Boolean operations before or after the type-shift. Applying the operation before the type-shift results in a narrow scope reading of the operator, but when it is applied after the type shift (which is the case in the (a)-sentences), a wide-scope reading of the Boolean operator results. Keenan & Faltz furthermore assume that natural language users can be rather sloppy, and sometimes use (7b) when they really mean (7a). Thus, due to our laziness, the (b)-sentences, but not the corresponding (a)-sentences, are in fact ambiguous. Partee & Rooth (1983) allow for type-shift only in case of type-mismatch. Type-mismatch might occur, for instance, when we want to coordinate two expressions with different types. By restricting the use of type-shift in this way they predict that when an operator of type ((r, t), t) wants to take as argument an expression of type (r, t), where this expression involves a 42 Here, and in the rest of this section, 'wide scope' reading means only the reading that intuitively corresponds with the reading where the coordinator actually had wide scope with regard to the permission operator in the syntactic tree according to an explicit scope analysis. 43 See also Groenendijk & Stokhof (1989) , t) ,t), t) should be induced by an explicit type-shift operator like that. This latter assumption, however, seems rather unnatural. Hendriks (1987) , on the other hand, allows for free type-shifting at any level, and in this way is able to account for the scope ambiguities of a sentence like Every man and woman walks by applying the conjunction before (narrow scope) or after (wide scope) the (optional) type-shift of the nouns man and woman.*
5
Notice that when we adopt Hendriks' free type-shift analysis, so that typeshift is possible even though not triggered by type-mismatch or explicit expressions, we do not have to assume that the ambiguity of (7b) and (8b) is due to our laziness of using the word that; ambiguity is simply almost always around when Boolean operators are used and type-shift is possible.
Suppose now that the speech act operator May in sentences like You may A and/or B takes as arguments expressions of type ((r, t), t), although the coordinates A and B might also denote entities of type r. This means that the interpretation of the embedded clause should involve a type-shift, and as a result it will be the case that also for permission sentences the Boolean operators can apply either before or after the type shift. Let us also assume that the relevant type-shift is one from propositions to sets of sets of propositions, and that if A denotes a proposition, s(A) has as its denotation its type-shifted counterpart. If we now would give a standard truthconditional analysis of permission sentences, this would immediately result in a narrow-and a wide-scope reading of the Boolean operator, just like in the case of (7a)-(7b). 46 However, we have argued above that to account for the performative effect, our analysis should not be truthconditional, but should rather be performative, by changing the permissibility set. The question now is whether and how we can use the type-shift to account for the performative effect of conjunctive permission sentences.
I will propose using the type-shift by making use of the standard minimality operator:
and by defining the update of P with May (John, E) , where E is of type (((s,t) ,t),t), as follows:
Upd(May(john,E),P) = {J {P~B\3C G min(E): B G C}
Suppose now that the embedded clause is conjunctive in nature and involves A and B. In that case the embedded clause is either of the form 's(A) A s(B)' and denotes {C C p(W)\A G C} n {C C p(W)\B G C}, or is of the form l s(AAB)' and will denote {C C p(W)\{A nB) G C}. Notice that both the first and the second object contains only one minimal element. 47 However, these minimal elements are not the same. In the first case the minimal element itself contains two propositions, A and B, but in the second case the minimal element contains only one proposition, the proposition denoted by A A B. By our definition of the update-operator, this means for the second case that only worlds are added that make both A and B true, and the package-deal is predicted just like before. 48 When conjunction is applied after the type-shift, however, it is predicted due to our definition of the update function that both A A ->B worlds and B A ->A-worlds might be added to the permissibility set, because the minimal element of the denotation of l s(A) A s(B)' contains both the proposition A and the proposition B. As a result, the new permissibility set might contain possibly some A A ->B-worlds and some -<A A B-worlds, just like we wanted.
It is worth observing that our above analysis also has an interesting consequence for disjunctive permission sentences. First, consider the case where the disjunction of the embedded clause has narrow scope with respect to the lifting operator, May(s{A V B) ). In that case, disjunctive permissions have the same reading as in the original Stalnaker approach; the best A V Bworlds are added to the permissibility set. But now suppose that the disjunction has wide scope with respect to the lifting operator, May(s{A) V s(B)). Now it will be the case, due to our definition of the update by permission sentences, that May(s{A) V s [B) ) has the same effect on the permissibility set as its corresponding conjunctive May(s{A) A s[B) ), if A and B are atomic. This means that in distinction with the corresponding conjunctive case, the application of disjunction after type-shift does not really result in a wide scope reading for disjunction. But this seems to be wrong, given disjunctive permission sentences like (2), repeated below as (9): (9) You may take an apple or a pear, but I don't know which. 47 If A and B are atomic. 48 Although conjunctive permission sentences do not always give rise to the package-deal effect, we have seen in section 6 that some conjunctive permissions do in fact have a package-deal reading.
that do not give rise to the free-choice reading. In (9), the disjunction intuitively has widest scope, representing the epistemic ignorance of the master about what is actually allowed. However, I don't think this is a problem for our analysis, because (9) seems to be used assertorically, and not performatively. If it had been used performatively, it would have violated the felicity condition of the speech act whose intended success conditions the speaker knows.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued for a performative analysis of command and permission sentences. I have shown that by the standard Lewis/Stalnaker/ Kamp analysis of permissions in terms of contraction most intuitions concerning coordinate connectives and quantificational determiners can be explained. An important problem for this approach turned out to be the analysis of conjunctive permission sentences. I first discussed a proposal to solve this problem in terms of what might be called 'relevant contraction', but in the end I argued that we should account for the problem of conjunctive permission sentences in terms of type-shift.
